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Abstract
We investigate whether the returns to mobile information and communication
technology (ICT) in the workplace are contingent on granting employees autonomy
over the structure of their workday through trust-based work time arrangements
(TBW). Our regression analysis is based on a production function framework and
exploits fine-grained firm survey data on ICT use and organisational practices for
1,045 service firms in Germany. We find empirical support for the argument that
the returns to mobile ICT are higher when TBW allows for discretion over when,
where and how to perform work-related tasks. The finding holds when we account
for more limited forms of workplace flexibility, suggesting that the high degree of
formal employee autonomy under TBW drives the complementarity between mobile
ICT and organisational practices.
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1 Introduction
Developments in information and communication technology (ICT) have been a main
driver of changes in the workplace in recent decades and the successful adoption of digital
technologies is deemed to be crucial for firms’ competitiveness. One of the key techno-
logical innovations in the workplace in recent years has been the diffusion of mobile ICT
with an internet connection, such as notebooks, tablets and smartphones. The expansion
of mobile ICT marks the next step in the decentralisation of computing technologies fol-
lowing the development of the personal computer, which relocated computing power from
mainframe computers to workers’ desktops in the 1980s, and the diffusion of the internet
in the 1990s (Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1997). In Germany, for instance, the diffusion of these
two classical forms of ICT in the workplace has by now almost stagnated, as measured by
the share of employees working predominantly at a personal computer or having access
to the internet (Figure 1). In contrast, the share of employees who have been equipped
with mobile ICT devices by their employer has nearly doubled from 12% to 23% between
2010 and 2014. Firms’ adoption of mobile ICT is driven by the dramatically declining
prices of these technologies and improvements in the wireless infrastructure supporting
mobile connectivity, i.e. access to internal documents and information as well as the abil-
ity to communicate with customers and business partners from virtually everywhere at
any time.
« Figure 1 about here »
With digital communication and information processing becoming increasingly ubiq-
uitous, mobile ICT is widely expected to change how work will be organised in the future,
dissolving its temporal and spatial boundaries (e.g. Kossek and Michel, 2010). This ex-
pectation is in line with empirical findings at the individual level showing that employees
exploit mobile ICT to exert more control over their working environment and gain in-
creased flexibility in where, when and how they perform work-related tasks (e.g. Golden
and Geisler, 2007; Hislop and Axtell, 2011; Mazmanian et al., 2013). The greater individ-
ual flexibility provided by mobile ICT suggests that firms can leverage these technologies
when formal work arrangements accommodate complementary organisational decision
rights. In this vein, descriptive firm-level evidence based on cross-country surveys shows
that the use of mobile ICT for the purpose of working outside the employer’s physical
premises is often associated with increased working time autonomy (Eurofound and In-
ternational Labour Office, 2017). The hypothesis that the diffusion of mobile ICT can
lead to changes in the organisation of work is also justified by existing research on the
effects of ICT on firm performance. A considerable body of evidence shows that firms
must match distinct (information) technologies with adequate organisational practices in
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order to achieve higher productivity gains from technology adoption. In particular, this
literature highlights organisational practices which emphasise employee autonomy and de-
centralised decision making to act as organisational complements to generic investments
in ICT (e.g. Bresnahan et al., 2002). However, direct empirical evidence supporting the
notion that mobile ICT can move organisational practices towards greater flexibility due
to complementarity is still scarce.
In this study, we investigate the importance of mobile ICT for a firm’s internal or-
ganisation by focusing on complementarity between the use of mobile ICT and flexible
work arrangements. In particular, we study whether firms can achieve higher produc-
tivity gains from mobile ICT if it is matched by organisational practices which delegate
appropriate decision rights over when, where and how to engage in work-related tasks. As
mobile ICT has started to uncouple information access and processing from office space
and standard working hours, harnessing their full potential might require that employees
are provided with extensive control over the whole structure of the workday. Working
arrangements granting this high degree of employee autonomy have become more and
more common and are referred to as “trust-based work time” arrangements (TBW) (Go-
dart et al., 2017).1 TBW differs from more traditional flexible working arrangements as
it involves a transition from working time registration to the evaluation of employees by
measurable objectives, i.e. a shift from input control to output control, thus reducing the
emphasis on when and where work is completed (Beckmann and Hegedues, 2011; Singe
and Croucher, 2003). Establishing a results-only work environment, TBW implies work-
place flexibility along multiple dimensions and often gives employees the right to decide
where they work, thus allowing them to work from home (Kelly et al., 2011; Moen et al.,
2011).
In order to test whether employee autonomy granted by TBW is relevant for the
efficient use of mobile ICT, we account for complementarities in a classical production
function framework. For our regression analysis, we gathered unique survey data contain-
ing detailed information on the use of ICT and organisational practices in 1,045 German
service firms. The data allow us to distinguish the degree of employee autonomy afforded
by TBW from that from more limited forms of workplace flexibility. In addition, we
conduct several sensitivity checks employing rich information on firm heterogeneity and
instrumental variable estimation. As a country in which employee autonomy with regard
to the structure of the workday has a long-standing tradition, Germany serves as a par-
ticularly relevant setting for our analysis. In the aftermath of the introduction of flextime
arrangements in the 1960s (Avery and Zabel, 2001) and collective agreements in the metal
industry in 1984, sector and plant agreements on the structure of working hours became
1Beckmann et al. (2017) discuss these work arrangements using the term ”self-managed working time”.
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common and have led to great variation in arrangements across firms (Berg et al., 2004).
The importance of flexible work arrangements in Germany has also led TBW arrange-
ments to become an increasingly common phenomenon since their emergence during the
1990s (Godart et al., 2017).
We contribute to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, our
article is the first to empirically analyse complementarities between mobile ICT and firms’
internal organisation. It thus contributes to the understanding of the implications of one
of the recent technological changes in the workplace for organisational practices. In the
same way, the analysis sheds light on the returns on investments in these technologies
and in TBW as an organisational practice, respectively. We thereby provide a first step
to integrating the aspect of workplace flexibility into the literature on ICT productivity.
Furthermore, much of the prior work in the field has focused either on the manufacturing
sector, or on narrow settings, such as health care (Hitt and Tambe, 2016; Litwin, 2011).
In contrast, our study provides large-scale statistical evidence using data which is repre-
sentative of a wide range of service industries. The analysis thus more aptly addresses
the implications for knowledge-based work in increasingly service-oriented economies. Fi-
nally, we contribute to the increasing body of evidence, which expands the notion of
complementarity between ICT as a homogenous technology and generic ‘decentralised’
work organisation. In this vein, our study contributes to a more precise view of how
the advancement of specific technologies can raise the value of particular organisational
practices.
2 Background Discussion
2.1 ICT, employee autonomy and firm performance
This study is related to the vast literature on the effects of ICT and modern management
practices on firm performance and, more specifically, to the literature on complementari-
ties between ICT and organisational practices. Moreover, our analysis is related to studies
evaluating work-life balance practices and workplace flexibility.
ICT has long been a central aspect in research on firm performance as well as organi-
sational change. Positive productivity effects of ICT as a general purpose technology are
well-documented at the firm level and the individual level (e.g. Bertschek, 2012; Draca
et al., 2007; Kretschmer, 2012). One of the main findings of ICT productivity research is
that firms can differ considerably in their ability to realise the benefits of ICT investments.
Over time, it was found that firms which benefit most from their ICT use are those who
make complementary changes to their internal organisation and organisational decision
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rights (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). As mobile ICT has only started to diffuse quite
recently, large-scale empirical evidence on their effects on firm performance is scarce. An
exception is the study by Bertschek and Niebel (2013) who document a positive relation
between mobile ICT and labour productivity for a sample of German manufacturing and
service firms. Their analysis, however, abstracts from the potential interplay between this
new technology, work organisation and firm performance.
In general, the diffusion of ICT has coincided with radical changes in work organisation
moving away from traditional Tayloristic organisations to modern management practices
emphasising the decentralisation of decision-making processes and supporting incentives.
Bresnahan et al. (2002) provided early large-scale empirical evidence that firms’ ICT in-
vestment and organisational structures emphasising employee autonomy mutual reinforce
one another. Further studies have confirmed similar complementarities between ICT
and working arrangements in different contexts (e.g. Bartel et al., 2007; Garicano and
Heaton, 2010; Hitt and Tambe, 2016; Litwin, 2011). More recently, for instance, Bloom
et al. (2012) show that the higher returns to ICT use of US-based firms compared to firms
in Europe can be attributed to differences in the use of innovative people management
practices.
In contrast to treating ICT as a homogeneous technology, more recent theoretical and
empirical contributions have started to highlight that different types of ICT can have
distinct implications for firm performance and organisation (e.g. Aral and Weill, 2007).
Results from this literature suggest that mobile ICT as a specific technology might in-
teract with firms’ internal organisation differently from past waves of digitisation in the
workplace. For example, Aral et al. (2012) show that, by allowing firms to more accu-
rate monitor employee performance, human capital management software increases firm
productivity when used in conjunction with performance pay and human resource ana-
lytics practices. Based on a theoretical model of the organisation as a knowledge-based
hierarchy, Bloom et al. (2014) argue that information technologies and communication
technologies can have opposing effects on the discretion of employees. On the one hand,
better communication of knowledge shifts decisions to higher tiers of the hierarchy, thus
fostering specialisation and centralisation. Cheaper access to information, on the other
hand, has an empowering effect, which allows employees to solve problems and tasks
without relying on others. Along these lines, mobile ICT might foster employee auton-
omy to such a degree that ubiquitous access to digitised information leads to reduced
informational frictions. In this way, the potential costs of allowing employees to work au-
tonomously under flexible work arrangements might be reduced by information technology
which is uncoupled from standard workplaces and working hours.
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Even if mobile ICT and workplace flexibility practices are likely to be mutually re-
inforcing, their joint effect on firm performance is unclear a priori. From a theoretical
perspective, this technology-enabled workplace flexibility might improve employees’ effort
and job performance for several reasons. First, due to the delegation of decision rights
employees can use superior information to help them to complete their work-related tasks
most efficiently (Lazear and Gibbs, 2015). They can use private information to allo-
cate their working hours in accordance to life responsibilities or their individual circadian
rhythm and work when their personal productivity is at its peak (Pierce and Newstrom,
1980; Shepard et al., 1996). Second, since job autonomy is an important determinant of
self-motivation and work morale (Deci and Ryan, 1985), workplace flexibility might pos-
itively affect employees’ performance through job enrichment (Beckmann et al., 2017).
Third, worker effort might increase due to the reciprocal behaviour of employees who
value workplace flexibility as a fringe benefit provided by their employer.2
However, technology-enabled workplace flexibility could also exhibit detrimental ef-
fects on productivity-related factors. In line with the effort-recovery model (Meijman
and Mulder, 1998), a lack of cognitive distraction from work-related activities and the
interruption of leisure time for work-related reasons outside regular working hours can
provoke work-family conflicts (Boswell and Olson-Buchanan, 2007), reduce job satisfac-
tion or even cause mental strain and other health-related problems (Askenazy and Caroli,
2010; Sonnentag, 2001). Furthermore, allowing employees to work at disparate locations
and times involves principal-agent problems and might lead to higher coordination and
monitoring costs from the firm’s perspective (Alonso et al., 2008; Prendergast, 2002).
However, a growing number of empirical studies provide evidence for the positive ef-
fects of workplace flexibility in terms of TBW on individual effort (Beckmann et al., 2017),
firm productivity (Beckmann, 2016) and firms’ innovation success (Godart et al., 2017).
Furthermore, Bloom et al. (2015) recently provided experimental evidence for the positive
effects of spatial workplace flexibility in terms of working from home arrangements on job
performance and work satisfaction. In spite of a growing economic literature focussing
on workplace flexibility, this aspect has yet to be integrated into the ICT productivity
literature.
2.2 TBW and Flexible Work Arrangements in Germany
Besides technological advancements, rising societal demand for greater workplace flexibil-
ity and the pursuit of competitive advantages have driven firms to adopt new methods
of flexible organisation over recent decades (Council of Economic Advisors, 2010; Goldin,
2Social exchange theory (Homans, 1958) and gift exchange theory (Akerlof, 1982) describe this kind
of reciprocal behaviour.
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2014). Today, firms looking to increase worker autonomy have a whole continuum of
common working arrangements to choose from. These range from limited decision rights
over when the workday starts and finishes, or the option to work from home occasionally,
to extensive control over the entire structure of the workday. The working arrangement at
the latter extreme, trust-based work time, has become increasingly significant over recent
decades (Godart et al., 2017).
TBW implies workplace flexibility along multiple dimensions. As summarised by
Kossek and Michel (2010), workplace flexibility practices can generally encompass em-
ployee autonomy over the dimensions of when to work, such as working time accounts,
where to work, such as working from home arrangements, how much to work, and the
continuity of work, such as long-term and short-term breaks. TBW is the only common
working practice to date that can span all of these dimensions and is therefore typically
considered the working arrangement which involves the highest degree of formal employee
autonomy in Germany (e.g. Wingen, 2004). The abandonment of records of working
times mitigates the employer’s direct control over the employees’ work effort. However,
the evaluation of employees by their work product under TBW can also reduce monitoring
costs (Beckmann et al., 2017) which would otherwise be high when employees effectively
use mobile ICT to work outside regular workplaces and working hours.
TBW is not explicitly defined under German labour law. However, in order to comply
with the law, the employer still has to assure that mandatory breaks and rest periods are
taken and that overtime is documented. Under TBW, the responsibility for documenting
overtime is usually delegated to the employee. Moreover, TBW is usually not part of the
contractual arrangement between employer and employee but settled through a firm wide
employment agreement. Due to the strong co-determination rights afforded to workers in
Germany, the works council is usually involved in such an organisational change related
to working hours and compensation.3
While the focus of our analysis lies on TBW as an organisational complement to mo-
bile ICT, we need to differentiate TBW from more limited forms of temporal and spatial
flexibility in our empirical analysis. In particular, with regard to temporal flexibility, we
consider the use of working time accounts. They cover a variety of more specific arrange-
ments which involve the accumulation of time credits/debits and differ in terms of how
long employees have to balance their account. One of the most common forms are flextime
arrangements, under which accounts must be balanced on a daily basis and which allow
employees to vary their start and end time around certain core mandatory hours (Avery
and Zabel, 2001). To date, they are still the most prominent flexible time arrangement in
Germany and employees use them extensively to adjust their weekly working schedule or
3See also the discussion by Godart et al. (2017).
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take time off to take care of family and personal issues (Promberger, 2001; Seifert, 1993).
Finally, we want to differentiate TBW from working arrangements which purely grant
spatial flexibility by allowing employees to work off-site at multiple, disparate locations.
To date, working from home arrangements are the dominating working arrangements
granting flexibility regarding the place of work. Typical working from home arrange-
ments allow employees to work part of their regular paid working hours from home, either
occasionally or on a regular basis (Council of Economic Advisors, 2010). The number of
individuals and jobs compatible with home-based work has been closely related to devel-
opments in ICT since employees working off-site are dependent on technology to interact
with colleagues, engage in work-related tasks and deliver their work output.
3 Methodology
Complementarity between two economic activities x1 and x2, in our case the use of mobile
ICT and TBW, implies that doing more of one activity increases the marginal benefit of
doing the other. In principle, the literature has put forward two types of statistical tests for
the existence of complementarities between economic activities (Athey and Stern, 1998;
Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013). Most commonly, studies test for complementarities
indirectly, by looking at (controlled) correlations between input factors (factor demand
equations). If two activities are complements and this is well understood by the firm, one
should observe a clustering of adoption decisions. Thus a significant positive correlation
is a necessary condition for complementarity (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). A more
direct test for complementarities focuses on analysing performance differences. This in-
volves testing whether the hypothesised complements are more productive when adopted
jointly rather than individually by estimating productivity equations. Formally, if the
firms’ production function f(x1, x2) is smooth and twice continuously differentiable in the
potential complements, x1 and x2, complementarity of the two variables is indicated by a
positive cross-partial derivative of the production function: (∂2f/∂x1∂x2) > 0 (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1990).
Each of the two tests tends to have the highest statistical power when the other is
weakest. If mobile ICT and TBW were actually complements, firms would seek to adopt
them jointly. If managers are fully aware of a set of complements and have complete
control over the individual factors, we would expect all firms to adopt the system of
complements and correlation will be strong. A productivity test, on the contrary, would
have little power to identify benefits from adopting the system of complements in this
hypothetical situation, as firms would not adopt one complement in isolation. However,
in a situation where firms are still experimenting with various practices or do not have
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full control over any of the complementary factors, correlation of complementary practices
would not be perfect but there should be detectable differences in productivity (Aral et
al., 2012; Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013).
The latter case is likely more relevant to our application, especially due to the novelty
of mobile ICT. As mobile ICT only recently started diffusing in the business sector and
wireless internet infrastructure in Germany has matured only over recent years, firms’
knowledge of how to make effective use of these new technologies is likely still limited.
Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) show that complements
might be upgraded at different times if their identification and implementation involves
uncertainty and learning. In addition, we draw on the vast literature on organisational
practices and complements, which assumes that organisational practices tend to persist
over time and are hard to change in the case of incumbent firms, as justified by high
adjustment costs of organisational change (Autor et al., 2002; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990;
Tambe et al., 2012). Consequently, if organisational practices are quasi-fixed in the short
run, managers were not able to act on them efficiently over the diffusion period of mobile
ICT. While mobile ICT and relevant organisational complements might not be clustered
under these circumstances, their joint impact on productivity will still be measurable.
We therefore focus on analysing complementarities within a classical production function
framework.
Economic theory views the production process of a firm as a function describing how
the production inputs consumed by the firm can be transformed into output. In line
with much of the literature, we conduct our productivity test for complementarity be-
tween mobile ICT and TBW within an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function
framework, which postulates a simple functional relationship between the output a firm
produces and the inputs it requires. This production function is most commonly used in
the ICT productivity literature (Cardona et al., 2013), in studies on productivity returns
to organisational practices and work arrangements (e.g. Beckmann et al., 2017; Black and
Lynch, 2004; Shepard et al., 1996) and, in particular, in studies testing for complementar-
ity between ICT and organisation (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Tambe
et al., 2012). It relates the output produced by firm i, Yi, to the inputs labour, Li, and
physical capital, Ki, such that
Yi = AiKαKi LαLi . (1)
In addition, Ai is a Hicks-neutral productivity term. This firm-specific efficiency is allowed
to depend on the use of mobile ICT (MICTi) as well as trust-based work (TBWi):
Ai = exp(α + βMICTi + γTBWi + δ(MICTi ∗ TBWi) + λ′xi + ui). (2)
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In this way, mobile ICT and TBW are allowed to shift the firms’ production possibility
frontier and make the use of other inputs, such as capital and labour, more productive.
We furthermore have productivity depend on other observable factors, xi, such as firms’
general ICT intensity and the employees’ skill structure, as well as a stochastic residual,
ui.
Combining Equations (1) and (2) and taking logs, our primary model for the aug-
mented Cobb-Douglas production function which we will estimate reads as
ln (Yi) = α + αLln(Li) + αK ln(Ki)+
+ βMICTi + γTBWi
+ δ(MICTi ∗ TBWi) + λ′xi + ui.
(3)
Extended Cobb-Douglas production functions analogous to Equation (3) have been the
workhorse model in the empirical literature on complementarities, as they constitute an
approximation of more complex production functions (such as the translog) which is easy
to interpret. The β and γ coefficients capture the main effects of mobile ICT and TBW.
Our primary interest lies in the model parameter δ: A positive cross-partial derivative of
the production function with respect to mobile ICT and TBW indicates that the two form
a system of complements reinforcing each other and using TBW intensively increases the
marginal return of using mobile ICT. Given our specification of the empirical production
function, the test on the cross-partial derivative boils down to checking whether δ > 0
after controlling for other factors affecting the production process. We estimate our model
by ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. After
estimating Equation (3) as our baseline model, we will subsequently test the robustness
of our main findings to common threats to identifying complements within a production
function framework.
4 Data and Variables
4.1 Data Set
For our empirical analysis, we employ fine-grained survey data on the use of ICT, TBW
and other flexible working practices in German service firms. The data originate from the
firm-level ICT-Survey by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) conducted
via computer-assisted telephone interviews in 2014/2015.4 In the services sector, knowl-
edge work is a considerable input share and workplace flexibility is more prevalent than in
4For detailed information on the data see Bertschek et al. (2017). For further information on data
access see http://kooperationen.zew.de/en/zew-fdz/provided-data/zew-ict-survey.html.
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sectors requiring employees to work at a fixed workplace in order to perform their tasks,
such as manufacturing (Eurofound and International Labour Office, 2017). Focusing our
analysis on the services sector, furthermore reduces heterogeneity of production processes
across the firms in our estimation sample.
After data cleaning and due to item-nonresponse we arrive at a final estimation sample
of 1,045 observations.5 As the industry affiliation was manually verified during the survey
process and is thus full observed, it can be used to assess the representativeness of the
estimation sample. The distribution of the firms over industries in the full sample and the
estimation sample is shown in Table A.1 in the appendix and suggests that the distribution
over industries is about the same in both samples.
4.2 Variables
An overview of the key variables in our analysis is provided by Table A.2 in the appendix.
In order to measure the firms’ use of mobile ICT, we asked for the share of employees
the firms equipped with mobile devices which provide wireless internet access, such as
notebooks, smartphones or tablets (% emp. mobile ICT ).
Our measure for mobile ICT thus encompasses a range of devices which employees use
to conduct their work-related tasks. As wireless connectivity has advanced considerably
during recent years, so have the possibilities to remotely access relevant internal digital
resources. Based on our estimation sample, Table A.3 shows the share of firms providing
external access to internal digital resources along the distribution of the use of mobile
ICT. These exemplary digital resources illustrate the functionality of mobile ICT and
range from corporate email accounts, internal wikis or intranet, enterprise software, to
internal network drives. Within the lowest (highest) tercile of the distribution of mobile
ICT among employees, 60% (82%) of firms enable remote access to the corporate email
account and in roughly 40% (70%) of firms employees can access enterprise software or
internal network drives using mobile ICT remotely.
Since firms that use mobile ICT might also exhibit a high general ICT intensity, we
have to differentiate the use of mobile ICT from other forms of ICT used in the workplace.
Therefore, we measure the firms’ general ICT intensity in terms of the share of employees
who work predominantly with a computer (% emp. working with PC ). This measure is a
common proxy for general purpose ICT and has been widely used in the ICT productivity
literature (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012; Bresnahan et al., 2002). Finally, the firms’ general
5We drop firms with sales of less than 10,000 euro (4 Observations) and more than one million euro
(31 Observations) per employee. Since investment enters the empirical model in logarithmic form, for 46
observations with reported investment of zero we replace investments by the 10th percentile of investments
per employee in the corresponding industry multiplied by the number of employees in the firm.
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(mainly fixed-line) internet connectivity is measured by the share of employees who have
access to the internet in the workplace (% emp. internet access).
We measure the use of TBW and other flexible working arrangements in a similar
fashion. Firms were asked whether they provide trust-based work time, i.e. self-reliant
organisation of working time without formal records of hours kept by the company. In a
follow-up question, we asked for the share of employees working under TBW arrangements.
Since firms might be very heterogenous in terms of how intensive these arrangements are
effectively used, we use this share as the measure of firms’ use of TBW (% emp. TBW).
In our analysis, we want to distinguish the degree of employee autonomy embraced by
TBW from that of more limited forms of workplace flexibility. Therefore, we also surveyed
and control for the firms’ share of employees with working time accounts (% emp. WTA)
and working from home arrangements (% emp. WFH ).
Following a standard approach in the estimation of production functions, we use data
on sales as the output measure (Syverson, 2011). We measure labour in full-time equiv-
alent terms, assuming that part-time employees constitute on average half of a full-time
employee. As we do not observe capital inputs, we use investment expenditures to ap-
proximate capital, assuming that investments are proportional to the firms’ capital stock
(e.g. Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004; Raymond et al., 2015).
In addition, we include a rich set of control variables in all our estimations. The
employees’ abilities and skills are important determinants of productivity. Moreover, there
is a large literature on skill-biased technological and organisational change documenting
how technological progress and organisational change over past decades have favoured
more educated and skilled workers (Autor et al., 2003; Black and Lynch, 2001; Caroli
and Van Reenen, 2001; Entorf et al., 1999). We thus control for the skill profile of the
workforce by including the share of employees with a university degree and the share of
employees with a vocational education. Empirical evidence suggests that the age profile
of the employees may be related to productivity and that older workers use ICT less
than younger workers (Friedberg, 2003; Go¨bel and Zwick, 2012). Hence, we account for
the age profile of the workforce by including the share of employees below the age of 30
into the empirical model. As discussed above, in Germany the works council is usually
involved in organisational change related to working hours and compensation, such as the
introduction of TBW. We thus include a binary indicator taking the value one if the firm
has a works council established. Furthermore, we account for employees’ workload as a
potential confounding factor since arrangements involving high workplace flexibility and
mobile ICT usage are often criticised for potentially increasing the employees’ workload
and leading to longer hours (Eurofound and International Labour Office, 2017). We
employ the share of employees working overtime as a measure for the workload of a
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firm’s employees. Taking the literature on the positive relation between productivity and
export activities into account (e.g. Lileeva and Trefler, 2010), we control for the share
of exports in total sales. Moreover, we include nine industry dummies constructed from
two digit standard industry codes (NACE), which account for productivity dispersions,
output prices, demand and other dispersions across industries.6 Finally, to account for well
documented structural differences between East and West Germany, we include a dummy
indicating whether the firm is located in East Germany. Further firm characteristics
employed for sensitivity analyses are described in the respective sections.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of our analysis. On average,
the firms have 109 employees (in full-time equivalent terms) and achieved a sales volume of
19 million euros. Both values show that our sample largely consists of small- and medium-
sized enterprises. The firms’ average investment expenditures amount to 1 million euros
and 26% of the employees have a university degree. In terms of firms’ general ICT
intensity, on average 62% of the employees work predominantly with a PC and 74% have
access to the internet in the workplace.
« Table 1 about here »
On average, the employers have equipped a share of 33% of their employees with
mobile ICT devices. Furthermore, on average 34% of the employees are entitled to work
under TBW arrangements.7 Figure 2 depicts the use of mobile ICT and the incidence of
TBW by industry among the firms in our sample. Mobile ICT is most commonly used in
the ICT Services sector where over 60% of employees have been equipped with mobile ICT
in the average firm. They have also widely diffused in consulting and advertising firms,
as well as in the Technical Services sector, whereas they are least common in the Retail
Trade sector. Figure 2 also demonstrates that the use of TBW is quite common over most
service sectors. On average, around half of the employees in the ICT Services, Technical
Services and the Consulting and Advertising industry are entitled to TBW. Again, they
are least common in the Retail Trade industry.8 As Table A.4 makes evident, even within
the industries we consider there is considerable heterogeneity in the diffusion of mobile
6In addition to heterogeneity across industries, there may be firm-specific prices which are unobserved.
As we measure the dependent variable by sales, not physical output, the coefficients in the empirical model
should be interpreted to reflect not only the technological parameters of the production function, but
also the firms’ market power (Bloom et al., 2012). We address this issue empirically in Section 5.2.2.
7In our estimation sample, 86% of the firms use mobile ICT and 59% of the firms use TBW in some
way.
8Our main results are robust to the exclusion of ICT Services as well as the Retail Trade sector from
the estimation sample.
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ICT and TBW. For the share of employees equipped with mobile ICT, the interquartile
range amounts to 45% or more in many industries. The table also demonstrates that the
distribution of TBW contains more extreme values of 0 and 1, meaning that either the
firm does not offer TBW at all, or all employees are actually working under TBW.
« Figure 2 about here »
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 provides the estimation results of the production function model in Equation
(3). In Column (1), we estimate a basic version of the production function including all
basic control variables discussed above as well as the share of employees being equipped
with mobile ICT (% emp. mobile ICT ) as the single measure of ICT use in the firm and
the share of employees working under TBW (% emp. TBW ). The main effects of both
variables of interest are positive, statistically significant and economically meaningful.
Firms with a 10 percentage points higher share of employees equipped with mobile ICT
exhibit a 1.19% higher output. Similarly, firms with a 10 percentage points higher share of
employees working under TBW have a 1.02% higher output. All other coefficients are in
line with expectations. For instance, the share of high-skilled employees exhibits a higher
output elasticity than the share of medium-skilled employees. Export intensity is strongly
related to firms’ output while the share of employees working overtime yields a statistically
insignificant coefficient. In Column (2), we additionally include the share of employees
working mainly with personal computers and the share of employees with access to the
internet in order to differentiate mobile ICT from other, more general forms of ICT use
in the workplace. The main effects of mobile ICT and TBW become insignificant, while
the firms’ general ICT intensity is positively and significantly related to the firms’ output.
Finally, in Column (3) we estimate the full baseline model according to Equation (3) in
order to test for complementarity between mobile ICT and TBW. Our estimation result
in this baseline model supports the complementarity hypothesis. The interaction between
mobile ICT and TBW is positive, as well as statistically and economically significant.
At the average utilisation of TBW in our estimation sample, an increase in the share of
employees being equipped with mobile ICT by 20 percentage points is associated with a
1.5% increase in output ((−0.054 + 0.380 ∗ 0.34) ∗ 20). Similarly, an increase in the share
of employees working under TBW by 20 percentage points is associated with a 1.15%
increase in output at the average rate of mobile ICT use.
« Table 2 about here »
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In Table 3, we introduce further control variables for the prevalence of other forms
of workplace flexibility into our model in order to differentiate TBW from more limited
forms of temporal and spatial flexibility. We additionally control for the share of employees
with working from home arrangements as well as for the share of employees with working
time accounts. Overall, both types of workplace flexibility yield an insignificant main
effect. More importantly, the respective pairwise interactions with mobile ICT yield a
small and also statistically insignificant coefficient. In contrast, our previous results on
the interaction between mobile ICT and TBW remain unchanged. The fact that the
empirical results only support complementarity of mobile ICT with TBW suggests that it
is the high degree of employee autonomy granted by TBW which is mutually reinforcing
with mobile ICT, rather than more limited forms of workplace flexibility.
« Table 3 about here »
5.2 Extensions and Robustness Tests
So far, our results provide some initial indicative conditional correlations in support of the
hypothesis of complementarity between mobile ICT and TBW. However, we must be cau-
tious in interpreting our results due to common challenges in testing for complementarities
(Athey and Stern, 1998).
First, instead of the joint adoption of mobile ICT and TBW affecting productivity,
causality could potentially run in the opposite direction. For instance, firms with a
positive productivity shock and improved cash flows might be more likely to invest in
new technologies. Likewise, well-performing firms might be in a better position to offer
their employees the amenity of workplace flexibility.
Second, our results could be driven by unobserved factors causing a correlation between
mobile ICT, the adoption of TBW and productivity. A widely expressed concern in the
literature is that unobserved good (human resource) management may be causing the
joint adoption of new technologies and specific advanced management practices as well as
their joint covariance with performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011; Brynjolfsson and
Hitt, 2000; Tambe et al., 2012).
Concerning the endogeneity of organisational practices in our model, we follow most
of the literature and assume that organisational practices are quasi-fix over the short
run.9 In this vein, we assume that firms’ internal organisation only changed marginally
during the short diffusion period of mobile ICT and does not constitute a choice variable
in our model. In this sense, one can interpret our regressions as assessing whether firm
differences in organisational design, which existed prior to the diffusion of mobile ICT,
9See the discussion in Section 3.
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affect the returns from using these technologies (Aral et al., 2012). Since one might still
be concerned about endogeneity of mobile ICT in our production function, we conduct
several sensitivity tests in the following.
5.2.1 Management Quality and Technology-Skill Complementarity
As a first robustness check of our results, we address the problem of omitted variable bias.
In particular, we focus on the issue that the positive coefficient on the interaction term (δ)
might pick up unobserved management and organisational practices other than workplace
flexibility. Our data include information on additional ‘modern’ managerial practices,
which have been used to assess the management quality of firms (Bloom and Reenen, 2007)
and have frequently been analysed in the ICT productivity literature and the personnel
economics literature (Bartel et al., 2007; Black and Lynch, 2001; Cappelli and Neumark,
2001; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003; Ichniowski et al., 1997). These management practices
differ from traditional hierarchical organisation and emphasise the decentralisation of
decision authority, incentives and target setting, monitoring and multitasking. Besides
workplace flexibility, they have been characteristic of organisational change that has taken
place since the 1990s. We augment our model in Equation (3) by these management
practices and their interactions with mobile ICT in order to contrast TBW from possibly
confounding managerial and organisational practices that could bias our previous results.
Table A.6 provides summary statistics on the indicator variables for additional man-
agement and organisational practices we are able to take into account. We observe whether
the firm rewards employees based on effort by the use of incentive pay. We moreover take
into account the existence of business units with their own profit and loss responsibility,
such as profit centres, which has been used to proxy general decentralisation of decision
authority below central management in other studies (Acemoglu et al., 2007). We account
for target setting and monitoring by the firms’ use of regular objective agreements and
written performance appraisals. Finally, we observe whether the firms make use of job
rotation models to develop employees’ functional flexibility.
In Column (1) of Table 4, we augment our baseline specifications by the binary in-
dicators for the individual management practices. Only the use of incentive pay enters
our production function with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, while the
use of job rotation models yields a negative and significant estimate. In Column (2), we
also include the interactions between mobile ICT and the additional measures on man-
agement practices. While the additional interaction terms are statistically insignificant,
our previous results supporting the notion of complementarity between mobile ICT and
TBW remain unaffected. Moreover, the coefficient for the interaction term between mo-
bile ICT and TBW remains similar in magnitude to our baseline results. As the model
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in Column (2) includes many indicators for managerial and organisational practices, one
might be worried that the insignificant interaction terms with mobile ICT are a result
of a too rich model specification and multicollinearity. We thus aggregate the individual
working practices into a management z-score, following a standard practice (e.g. Bresna-
han et al., 2002; Tambe et al., 2012), which is motivated by the literature on ‘systems
of workplace innovations’ (Ichniowski et al., 1996). In particular, we take the sum over
all indicators which yield a positive estimate in Column (1) (all practices excluding job
rotation models) and standardise this variable.10 This standardised management score is
positively and significantly related to output (Column 3). An increase in the score by one
standard deviation is associated with an 8.8% higher output. Reassuringly, its interaction
with mobile ICT remains statistically insignificant.
« Table 4 about here »
In Table 5, we perform a further check of our main findings, referring to the literature
on skill-biased technological and organisational change (Autor et al., 2003; Caroli and Van
Reenen, 2001). While we accounted for the skill profile of the workforce throughout all
our estimations, we now include an additional interaction term between the share of high-
skilled employees and the use of mobile ICT as well as TBW, respectively. We thereby
test whether it is actually the simultaneous presence of a skilled workforce in firms using
mobile ICT or TBW intensively that drives our findings. Again, the estimation results
show that the coefficients for the additional interaction terms are insignificant, while our
previous finding remains unaffected. We thus assume that our main finding does not
merely reflect complementarity of mobile ICT or TBW with skills.
« Table 5 about here »
5.2.2 Collinearity, Functional Form and Mark-Ups
Additional robustness tests are included in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the appendix. As
some key technological and organisational variables in our model exhibit non-negligible
correlation,11 we mitigate potential multicollinearity by excluding the control variables
measuring alternative use of ICT besides mobile ICT in Table A.7. We then assess
interactions between the use of mobile ICT and TBW (Column 1), working from home
arrangements (Column 2) and working time accounts (Column 3) in isolation. Our original
10Summing over the individual indicators for managerial and organisational practices to build an ag-
gregate score implies that each practice is given equal weight in the indicator. This approach is justified
by a test of equality of coefficients on the main effects of the individual practices in Column (1), which
cannot reject equality. Standardisation is obtained by substracting the overall mean and dividing by the
sample standard deviation (see e.g. Rasel, 2016).
11See Table A.5 for correlations among key variables.
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results hold and the interaction between mobile ICT and TBW yields the sole statistically
significant coefficient. In Column 5 of the same table, we address potential functional form
misspecification of our production function. In particular, we consider the full second
order expansion in mobile ICT and TBW by adding their quadratic terms to the model.
If the production function could in fact be approximated by this functional form, leaving
out the squared variables might result in a spurious significant coefficient on the interaction
term because the two potential complements are positively correlated. In addition, by
including the squared terms we obtain insights into whether the use of mobile ICT or
TBW entail diminishing marginal returns.
In Table A.8, we address the fact that we use sales data as output information so that
our estimates might reflect firm-level differences in output prices resulting from differences
in market power in addition to the technological parameters of the production function.
We address this issue of differential mark-ups due to market concentration by including
survey information on competitive pressure as perceived by the firm. Firms were asked
how they assess their own competitiveness within their industry: average, above-, or below
average. The information thus allows us to account for firm-level variation in contrast to
frequently used strategies which apply competition indices that only vary at the sectoral
level (Hottenrott et al., 2016). Overall, our estimation results show that our main result
is not affected by the inclusion of these control variables.12
5.2.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Even though the data make it possible to account for multiple sources of heterogeneity
between firms in the above regressions, the error term in the models might still pick up
unobservables which are correlated with firms’ decision to adopt mobile ICT and TBW
as well as the firms’ productivity. Additionally, our results above might still be subject
to reverse causation. In order to explicitly account for potential endogeneity of mobile
ICT in the production function, we perform an instrumental variable regression (IV)
(Athey and Stern, 1998; Biesebroeck, 2007). In general, finding instrumental variables,
which affect the firms’ output only through the potentially endogenous ICT input, is
challenging. As a fist step, we construct a measure for the average share of employees
being equipped with mobile ICT within an industry and firm-size class.13 The potential
costs and benefits of mobile ICT use differ between industries and firms of different sizes,
rendering the within-cell average a relevant instrument.14 In addition, after we control for
12All other results not shown in Table A.8 are also robust to the inclusion of the perceived competi-
tiveness measure but excluded for brevity.
13We construct this average over 45 cells, made up of 9 industries and 5 size classes. The size classes
are 5-19, 20-49, 50-249, 250-499 and >= 500 employees.
14This instrumental variable approach follows for instance Bertschek and Niebel (2016) or Pfeifer
(2016).
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the exact same industries as well as firm size in the production function, we can expect the
average by sector and size class to be related to firms’ output only through the potentially
endogenous variable. Since we want to assess the exogeneity of our instrumental variable,
we require additional instruments to test overidentifying restrictions.
For a second instrumental variable, we exploit the fact that interview partners in
the survey were the firm’s owner, senior manager, or the head of the IT department.
Therefore, the interviewees can be expected to have a considerable influence on the firms’
decisions to invest in mobile ICT. Similar to Bertschek and Niebel (2016), we use the years
since the individual respondent first owned a private smartphone as a second instrument.
Mobile electronic devices and applications first started proliferating among individuals
before their diffusion in the business sector. The first year of smartphone ownership is
therefore a good proxy for individual perception of the potential benefits and risks of
mobile technologies. This instrument is valid, if the interviewees attitude towards mobile
ICT is unrelated to other unobserved investment decisions by the firm. The information
on private smartphone use is available for a subsample of 1,001 observations. Applying
both instruments we compute the Hansen J-test statistic to assess the exogeneity of the
instruments and the validity of our instrumental variable approach.
Table 6 provides the second stage results of our IV estimation. For comparison to our
baseline results, Column (1) replicates the respective estimation for the slightly restricted
sample. The results are comparable to our main finding in Table 2. Column (2) shows
the results of the IV regression.15 The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic suggests that the
instruments are not weak. Moreover, the Hansen J-statistic is far away from the rejected
area, thus supporting the exogeneity of the instruments. Looking at the point estimate
on the interaction term between mobile ICT and TBW, our main results in support of
complementarity are confirmed in the instrumental variable estimation.
« Table 6 about here »
6 Conclusion
We provide large-scale empirical evidence on the organisational complements to mobile in-
formation and communication technology (ICT), which constitutes one of the key techno-
logical innovations in the workplace in recent years. Our analysis based on an augmented
production function framework supports the argument that the marginal benefit of adopt-
ing mobile ICT in the firm increases with the formal delegation of decision authority to
employees regarding the entire structure of their workday by means of trust-based work
15The corresponding first stage regressions are shown in Table A.9 in the appendix.
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time arrangements (TBW). These results hold when we account for alternative forms of
flexible work arrangements which provide more limited flexibility over the place of work,
or the work schedule.
While our analysis is based on observational data, which always exacerbates a clear
causal interpretation, our results are extremely consistent across different specifications,
making use of rich information on alternative complements, such as employees’ skills or
alternative organisational practices, as well as instrumental variable estimation. Overall,
we provide first direct empirical evidence on the interplay between mobile ICT and or-
ganisational practices, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the implications
of contemporary technology for work arrangements and firm performance, especially in
increasingly service-oriented economies.
Several mechanisms might lead to a system of mutually reinforcing complements
formed by mobile ICT and the high degree of employee autonomy granted by TBW.
On the one hand, mobile devices and infrastructure have enabled access to information
technology which is uncoupled from standard workplaces and working hours. Therefore,
mobile ICT can reduce information, coordination and communication costs within the
firm, which would otherwise increase when employees start working autonomously un-
der TBW. On the other hand, decentralisation involves principle agent problems, which
might result in shirking and increased monitoring costs. This is especially the case when
employees make effective use of mobile ICT by working outside regular workplaces and
working hours, thereby limiting the firm’s direct control over their work effort. TBW can
serve as a means to address these problems by transitioning from monitoring employees’
input to merely monitoring their output in a results-only working environment. Conse-
quently, a simultaneous use of mobile ICT and TBW might help to reap the benefits and
decrease the potential costs of one another.
Our analysis extends a vast empirical literature documenting how (information) tech-
nologies shape organisational practices and work arrangements. This literature, tradition-
ally based on general investments in ICT and broad metrics of organisation, has found
that firms realising benefits from ICT investments are those with complementary organ-
isational decision rights. We extend this literature by providing another example of how
specific types of work arrangements complement new technology. Our analysis thus in-
forms managers by documenting how distinct autonomous work practices are relevant for
firms making investments decisions in mobile ICT. As TBW implies a step towards greater
autonomy compared to more classical forms of workplace flexibility, our results suggest
that the degree of discretion of the employee matters in order to take advantage of these
new technologies. For firms that are not already characterised by an appropriately high
degree of employee autonomy over when and where they work, successful investment in
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mobile ICT can require additional investments in organisational change. Vice versa, our
study underlines the importance of technology when firms want to align their organisation
with increasing societal and economic needs for greater workplace flexibility.
Our study bears further implications for policy discussions. The results are in line
with the notion that, as mobile ICT further advances and proliferates, it will favour work
organisation based on high employee autonomy over the time and location of work and
lead to a greater use of such organisational strategies. As of right now, national regulations
in many industrialised countries do not directly address such flexible work schedules. As
workplace flexibility carries opportunities as well as risks for employers and employees,
demands for active regulation which serves the interest of both groups might accelerate
as the importance of such work practices continues to grow.
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7 Tables and Figures















Note: Figures are representative of firms with at least five employees in the manufacturing sector and
selected service industries in Germany. Source: Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (2015)






























% of employees with mobile ICT
% of employees in TBW
Note: Based on 1,045 observations in the estimation sample. Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables in Estimation Sample
Mean SD Min Max
Output
sales (in million Euro) 19.00 187.38 0.05 5600.00
ICT Use
% emp. mobile ICT 0.33 0.33 0 1
% emp. working with PC 0.62 0.37 0 1
% emp. internet access 0.74 0.35 0 1
Workplace Flexibility
% emp. TBW 0.34 0.42 0 1
% emp. WTA 0.51 0.46 0 1
% emp. WFH 0.14 0.23 0 1
Qualification and Age Structure
% high-skilled emp. 0.26 0.29 0 1
% medium-skilled emp. 0.59 0.29 0 1
% emp. under 30 0.24 0.18 0 1
Controls
employees (full-time equivalent) 109.06 568.76 1 12375
investments (in million Euro) 0.96 4.53 0 90
export share 0.05 0.15 0 1
% emp. overtime 0.48 0.36 0 1
works council 0.18 0.39 0 1
located in East Germany 0.29 0.45 0 1
Observations 1045
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table 2: Baseline Regression Results
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2) (3)
% emp. mobile ICT 0.119∗ 0.111 -0.054
(0.069) (0.069) (0.090)
% emp. TBW 0.102∗∗ 0.084 -0.068
(0.051) (0.052) (0.077)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.380∗∗∗
(0.137)
% emp. working with PC 0.230∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.092)
% emp. internet access -0.024 -0.006
(0.083) (0.083)
ln(employees) 0.921∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
ln(investment) 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
% high-skilled emp. 0.471∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.131) (0.130)
% medium-skilled emp. 0.287∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.244∗∗
(0.111) (0.112) (0.113)
% emp. under 30 -0.013 -0.023 -0.024
(0.121) (0.119) (0.118)
works council 0.015 0.018 0.015
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
export share 0.732∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.136) (0.135)
% emp. overtime 0.065 0.062 0.056
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
constant -1.640∗∗∗ -1.668∗∗∗ -1.668∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.138) (0.137)
Industry & Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.857 0.858
Observations 1045 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedastic-
ity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
23
Table 3: Baseline Results: Controlling for Alternative Workplace Flexibility Practices
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% emp. mobile ICT -0.065 -0.069 -0.055 -0.094 -0.108
(0.090) (0.092) (0.090) (0.111) (0.112)
% emp. TBW -0.066 -0.063 -0.069 -0.070 -0.065
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.351∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗
(0.143) (0.150) (0.137) (0.137) (0.150)
% emp. WFH 0.117 0.083 0.090
(0.110) (0.192) (0.192)
% emp. MICT * % emp. WFH 0.050 0.040
(0.246) (0.246)
% emp. WTA -0.023 -0.049 -0.049
(0.043) (0.060) (0.060)
% emp. MICT * % emp. WTA 0.075 0.072
(0.120) (0.120)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. All columns include controls for capital, labour, industry and regional
dummies, general ICT-intensity and internet use, the skill and age profile of the workforce, the in-
cidence of overtime, the firm’s export share, the presence of a works council and a constant (not
shown but available upon request). Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity.
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 4: Robustness Test: Management Practices
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2) (3)
% emp. mobile ICT -0.097 (0.093) -0.081 (0.123) -0.091 (0.092)
% emp. TBW -0.073 (0.076) -0.073 (0.076) -0.072 (0.076)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.380∗∗∗ (0.137) 0.385∗∗∗ (0.137) 0.378∗∗∗ (0.137)
incentive pay (IP) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.109∗ (0.058)
job rotation (JR) -0.115∗∗ (0.048) -0.078 (0.069)
profit center (PR) 0.066 (0.047) 0.071 (0.068)
objective agreements (OA) 0.035 (0.052) 0.031 (0.071)
performance appraisals (PA) 0.045 (0.051) 0.047 (0.071)
% emp. MICT * IP 0.008 (0.123)
% emp. MICT * JR -0.116 (0.161)
% emp. MICT * PR -0.014 (0.139)
% emp. MICT * OA 0.013 (0.156)
% emp. MICT * PA -0.009 (0.153)
Management Score 0.088∗∗∗ (0.033)
% emp. MICT * MM Score -0.010 (0.064)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.859 0.859 0.859
Observations 1045 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. All columns include controls for capital, labour, industry and regional
dummies, general ICT-intensity and internet use, the skill and age profile of the workforce, the in-
cidence of overtime, the firm’s export share, the presence of a works council and a constant (not
shown but available upon request). Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity.
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table 5: Robustness Test: Skill Complementarity
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2)
% emp. mobile ICT -0.019 (0.104) -0.077 (0.092)
% emp. TBW -0.079 (0.079) -0.037 (0.085)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.406∗∗∗ (0.144) 0.428∗∗∗ (0.144)
% high-skilled emp. (HSE) 0.429∗∗∗ (0.157) 0.434∗∗∗ (0.145)
% emp. MICT * % HSE -0.140 (0.194)
% emp. TBW * % HSE -0.154 (0.152)
Controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.857 0.857
Observations 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. All columns include controls for capital, labour, industry and regional dum-
mies, general ICT-intensity and internet use, age profile of the workforce, the incidence of overtime,
the firm’s export share, the presence of a works council and a constant (not shown but available upon
request). Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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% emp. mobile ICT -0.000 (0.091) 0.465 (0.384)
% emp. TBW -0.043 (0.077) -0.258 (0.164)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.314** (0.139) 0.731** (0.357)
% emp. working with PC 0.220** (0.097) 0.267*** (0.103)
% emp. internet access -0.009 (0.087) -0.146 (0.125)
ln(employees) 0.928*** (0.022) 0.963*** (0.029)
ln(investment) 0.093*** (0.014) 0.079*** (0.016)
% high-skilled emp. 0.337** (0.136) 0.143 (0.183)
% medium-skilled emp. 0.235** (0.114) 0.239** (0.116)
% emp. under 30 -0.054 (0.118) -0.056 (0.124)
works council 0.011 (0.065) 0.031 (0.067)
export share 0.697*** (0.142) 0.719*** (0.145)
% emp. overtime 0.075 (0.054) 0.071 (0.058)
constant -1.669*** (0.140) -1.780*** (0.154)
Industry & Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.857
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 10.601
Hansen J-test (P-value) 0.581
Observations 1001 1001
Note: OLS estimation in Column (1) and GMM estimation in Column (2). Standard errors
in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Industry Distribution in Estimation Sample and Full Sample
Industry NACE Rev. 2 Estimation Sample Full Sample
N % N %
Retail Trade 45, 47 127 12.2 228 11.9
Wholesale Trade 46 98 9.4 193 10.1
Transport Services 49-53, 79 122 11.7 217 11.3
Media Services 18, 58-60 93 8.9 164 8.5
ICT Services 61-63 112 10.7 223 11.6
Financial Services 64-66 110 10.5 231 12.0
Consulting, Advertising 69, 702, 73 135 12.9 231 12.0
Technical Services 71-72 110 10.5 191 10.0
Business Services 74, 78, 80-82 138 13.2 242 12.6
Total 1045 100 1920 100
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table A.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description/Question
Dependent variable
ln(sales) logarithm of sales (in million euro)
ICT use
% emp. mobile ICT What percentage of your employees have been equipped with mobile
devices with wireless internet access, such as notebooks, tablets and
smartphones?
% emp. working with PC What percentage of your employees work predominantly with a com-
puter in the workplace?
% emp. internet access What percentage of your employees have access to the internet in the
workplace?
Workplace flexibility
% emp. TBW Does your company use trust-based work time, i.e. self-reliant organ-
isation of working time without the company recording the number
of hours worked? To what percentage of employees do these arrange-
ments apply?
% emp. WTA Are there any regulations in your company related to working time
accounts, i.e. anything in between flextime and annual working hours
agreements? To what percentage do these arrangements apply?
% emp. WFH Do you offer your employees the opportunity to work from home regu-
larly, so called working from home arrangements? To what percentage
do these arrangements apply?
Qualification and age
% high-skilled emp. Share of employees holding a university, college or polytechnical de-
gree
% medium-skilled emp. Share of employees with an apprenticeship or holding a technical de-
grees
% emp. under 30 Share of employees under the age of 30
Overtime
% emp. overtime What percentage of your employees have worked overtime in the pre-
vious year? Overtime is defined as extra work performed exceeding
the agreed weekly working hours.
Management practices
Does your company employ any of the following human resource management practices?
incentive pay Performance-related pay
job rotation Job rotation
profit center Cost/profit autonomy, profit centers
objective agreements Regular written objective agreements
performance appraisals Regular written performance appraisals
Market concentration
competitiveness How do you assess the competitiveness of your company compared
to other companies in your industry? [above average, average, below
average]
Instrumental variables
years of smartphone use Number of years the interviewee personally owned a smartphone be-
fore 2015. Based on the question: In which year did you buy your
first smartphone?
average MICT (industry/size) Average share of employees equipped with mobile ICT within an in-
dustry and firm-size class (i.e. 45 cells, made up of 9 industries and 5
size classes).
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table A.3: Provision of External Access by Usage of Mobile ICT
Lowest Tercile Middle Tercile Highest Tercile
% emp. MICT % emp. MICT % emp. MICT
Mean Mean Mean
external access to corporate email-account 0.60 0.79 0.82
external access to wiki/intranet 0.36 0.53 0.60
external access to corporate software 0.39 0.56 0.66
external access to corporate networks 0.44 0.58 0.69
Observations 346 365 311
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
Table A.4: Distribution of Key Variables by Industry
Industry Variable Mean 25th Median 75th
Retail Trade % emp. mobile ICT 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.20% emp. TBW 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.10
Wholesale Trade % emp. mobile ICT 0.31 0.11 0.20 0.50% emp. TBW 0.24 0.00 0.10 0.30
Transport Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.31 0.05 0.15 0.50% emp. TBW 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.25
Media Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.35% emp. TBW 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.41
ICT Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.61 0.30 0.60 1.00% emp. TBW 0.52 0.00 0.50 1.00
Financial Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.50% emp. TBW 0.44 0.00 0.28 1.00
Consulting, Advertising % emp. mobile ICT 0.40 0.10 0.29 0.70% emp. TBW 0.48 0.00 0.34 1.00
Technical Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.41 0.15 0.33 0.67% emp. TBW 0.49 0.00 0.40 1.00
Business Services % emp. mobile ICT 0.29 0.05 0.15 0.45% emp. TBW 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.40
Total % emp. mobile ICT 0.33 0.07 0.20 0.50% emp. TBW 0.34 0.00 0.10 0.85
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table A.5: Raw Correlations of Key Variables
% emp. % emp. % emp. % emp. % emp.
mobile working internet TBW WFH
ICT with PC access
% emp. mobile ICT 1
% emp. working with PC 0.294∗∗∗ 1
% emp. internet access 0.355∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 1
% emp. TBW 0.295∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 1
% emp. WFH 0.484∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 1
% emp. WTA -0.029 0.084∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ -0.028 0.020
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics of Additional Variables
Mean SD Min Max N
Management Practices
incentive pay 0.50 0.50 0 1 1045
job rotation 0.19 0.39 0 1 1045
profit center 0.31 0.46 0 1 1045
objective agreements 0.44 0.50 0 1 1045
performance appraisals 0.38 0.49 0 1 1045
Market Concentration
competitiveness 1.52 0.54 1 3 1045
Instrumental Variables
years of smartphone use 5.47 4.13 0 22 1001
average MICT (industry/size) 0.34 0.15 0 1 1001
Source: ZEW ICT-Survey 2015.
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Table A.7: Robustness Test: Parsimonious Model and Functional Form Specification
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% emp. mobile ICT -0.025 (0.089) 0.078 (0.079) 0.097 (0.096) 0.253 (0.230)
% emp. TBW -0.032 (0.075) 0.241 (0.251)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.339∗∗ (0.136) 0.399∗∗∗ (0.142)
% emp. WFH 0.098 (0.187)
% emp. MICT * % emp. WFH 0.132 (0.232)
% emp. WTA -0.040 (0.060)
% emp. MICT * % emp. WTA 0.078 (0.123)
(% emp. MICT)2 -0.312 (0.226)
(% emp. TBW)2 -0.304 (0.250)
PC usage & Internet access No No No No
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.857
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. Columns 1-3 mitigate collinearity by omitting controls for PC and internet
usage. Column 4 additionally controls for squared terms of mobile ICT and trust-based work time. All
columns include controls for capital, labour, industry and regional dummies, the skill and age profile
of the workforce, the incidence of overtime, the firm’s export share, the presence of a works council
and a constant (not shown but available upon request). Standard errors in parentheses robust to
heteroskedasticity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table A.8: Robustness Test: Controlling for Market Concentration
Dependent Variable: ln(sales)
(1) (2) (3)
% emp. mobile ICT 0.118∗ (0.068) 0.110 (0.069) -0.056 (0.090)
% emp. TBW 0.102∗∗ (0.051) 0.085 (0.052) -0.068 (0.077)
% emp. MICT * % emp. TBW 0.380∗∗∗ (0.137)
% emp. working with PC 0.231∗∗ (0.092) 0.242∗∗∗ (0.093)
% emp. internet access -0.025 (0.084) -0.008 (0.084)
competitiveness: above average ref. ref. ref.
competitiveness: average -0.004 (0.039) -0.007 (0.039) -0.010 (0.039)
competitiveness: below average -0.045 (0.109) -0.037 (0.108) -0.032 (0.110)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.856 0.857
Observations 1045 1045 1045
Note: OLS estimations. This table replicates Table 2 and additionally controls for market concen-
tration. All columns include controls for capital, labour, industry and regional dummies, general
ICT-intensity and internet use, the skill and age profile of the workforce, the incidence of overtime,
the firm’s export share, the presence of a works council and a constant (not shown but available upon
request). Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table A.9: IV Estimation - First Stage Regression
(1) (2)
% emp. mobile ICT % emp. MICT * % emp. TBW
average MICT (ind./size) 0.517∗∗∗ (0.143) -0.112 (0.074)
average MICT (ind./size) * % emp. TBW 0.063 (0.154) 0.976∗∗∗ (0.125)
years of smartphone use 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.000 (0.001)
years of smartphone use * % emp. TBW 0.001 (0.006) 0.010∗∗ (0.005)
% emp. TBW 0.048 (0.064) 0.006 (0.056)
% emp. working with PC -0.078∗ (0.045) -0.042 (0.028)
% emp. internet access 0.223∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.024)
ln(employees) -0.030∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.019∗∗∗ (0.006)
ln(investment) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.004)
% high-skilled emp. 0.308∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.090∗∗ (0.041)
% medium-skilled emp. 0.021 (0.051) -0.020 (0.025)
% emp. under 30 -0.007 (0.053) -0.010 (0.035)
works council -0.029 (0.026) 0.000 (0.014)
export share -0.073 (0.061) -0.020 (0.042)
% emp. overtime 0.005 (0.026) 0.013 (0.017)
constant -0.024 (0.078) 0.087∗∗ (0.042)
Industry & Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1001 1001
Note: OLS estimations. Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p <
.05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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